17 ideas
17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
18438 | Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine] |
9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |