27 ideas
| 17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
| 17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 15035 | If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio] |
| 17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
| 17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
| 17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
| 17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
| 17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |