Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mathematics and Indispensibility', 'Our Knowledge of the External World' and 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
21584 A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
21572 Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21571 Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
21574 Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
21587 Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
21582 Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
21573 When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
21588 Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
21586 The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
21585 The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
21684 Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
22316 A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
9558 All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21576 With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21575 When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
21580 Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
21583 When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
21577 Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21579 Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
21578 Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
6416 Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
21581 We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]