Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'works' and 'Truth and Truthmakers'

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong]
Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong]
The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong]
One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong]
The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong]
What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong]
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood]
Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles]
The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles]
Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles]
If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles]
God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles]