147 ideas
| 14857 | The highest wisdom has the guise of simplicity [Nietzsche] |
| 14854 | Deep thinkers know that they are always wrong [Nietzsche] |
| 14833 | Comedy is a transition from fear to exuberance [Nietzsche] |
| 14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
| 14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
| 14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
| 14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
| 14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
| 14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
| 18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
| 14853 | Truth finds fewest champions not when it is dangerous, but when it is boring [Nietzsche] |
| 14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
| 24075 | Convictions, more than lies, are the great enemy of truth [Nietzsche] |
| 14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
| 14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
| 15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
| 14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
| 14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
| 14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
| 14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
| 14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
| 14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
| 18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
| 14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
| 14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
| 14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
| 15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
| 14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
| 14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
| 14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
| 14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
| 14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
| 18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
| 14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
| 14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
| 14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
| 14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
| 14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
| 14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
| 14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
| 14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
| 14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
| 14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
| 14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
| 14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
| 14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
| 14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
| 14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
| 14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
| 14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
| 14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
| 14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
| 7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
| 18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
| 14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
| 14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
| 14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
| 14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
| 9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
| 14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
| 14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
| 21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
| 18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
| 11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
| 14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
| 14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
| 14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
| 21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
| 10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
| 10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
| 7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
| 14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
| 14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
| 14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
| 14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
| 14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
| 11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
| 22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
| 14858 | Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche] |
| 14830 | Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain [Nietzsche] |
| 20378 | Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche] |
| 10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
| 10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
| 10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
| 14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
| 19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
| 19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
| 14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
| 14820 | People always do what they think is right, according to the degree of their intellect [Nietzsche] |
| 14856 | Our judgment seems to cause our nature, but actually judgment arises from our nature [Nietzsche] |
| 14842 | Why are the strong tastes of other people so contagious? [Nietzsche] |
| 14835 | Artists are not especially passionate, but they pretend to be [Nietzsche] |
| 14807 | The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche] |
| 14824 | It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche] |
| 14823 | Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche] |
| 22473 | Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 14812 | Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche] |
| 14810 | Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche] |
| 14831 | No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche] |
| 14855 | Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche] |
| 14815 | We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche] |
| 14849 | We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche] |
| 14818 | First morality is force, then custom, then acceptance, then instinct, then a pleasure - and finally 'virtue' [Nietzsche] |
| 20103 | You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche] |
| 14817 | The 'good' man does the moral thing as if by nature, easily and gladly, after a long inheritance [Nietzsche] |
| 14809 | All societies of good men give a priority to gratitude [Nietzsche] |
| 14816 | Justice (fairness) originates among roughly equal powers (as the Melian dialogues show) [Nietzsche] |
| 14821 | Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche] |
| 20112 | Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche] |
| 14841 | Many people are better at having good friends than being a good friend [Nietzsche] |
| 14843 | Women can be friends with men, but only some physical antipathy will maintain it [Nietzsche] |
| 14811 | In Homer it is the contemptible person, not the harmful person, who is bad [Nietzsche] |
| 20111 | We could live more naturally, relishing the spectacle, and not thinking we are special [Nietzsche] |
| 14844 | People do not experience boredom if they have never learned to work properly [Nietzsche] |
| 14808 | Over huge periods of time human character would change endlessly [Nietzsche] |
| 14822 | If self-defence is moral, then so are most expressions of 'immoral' egoism [Nietzsche] |
| 14838 | The state aims to protect individuals from one another [Nietzsche] |
| 14852 | Culture cannot do without passions and vices [Nietzsche] |
| 14846 | If we want the good life for the greatest number, we must let them decide on the good life [Nietzsche] |
| 14819 | Slavery cannot be judged by our standards, because the sense of justice was then less developed [Nietzsche] |
| 14847 | Laws that are well thought out, or laws that are easy to understand? [Nietzsche] |
| 14814 | Execution is worse than murder, because we are using the victim, and really we are the guilty [Nietzsche] |
| 14836 | People will enthusiastically pursue an unwanted war, once sacrifices have been made [Nietzsche] |
| 14845 | Don't crush girls with dull Gymnasium education, the way we have crushed boys! [Nietzsche] |
| 14839 | Interest in education gains strength when we lose interest in God [Nietzsche] |
| 14848 | Education in large states is mediocre, like cooking in large kitchens [Nietzsche] |
| 14834 | Teachers only gather knowledge for their pupils, and can't be serious about themselves [Nietzsche] |
| 14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
| 14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
| 14825 | In religious thought nature is a complex of arbitrary acts by conscious beings [Nietzsche] |
| 14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
| 14826 | Modern man wants laws of nature in order to submit to them [Nietzsche] |
| 14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
| 14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
| 14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
| 14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
| 14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
| 14827 | The Greeks saw the gods not as their masters, but as idealised versions of themselves [Nietzsche] |
| 14813 | Science rejecting the teaching of Christianity in favour of Epicurus shows the superiority of the latter [Nietzsche] |
| 14832 | The Sermon on the Mount is vanity - praying to one part of oneself, and demonising the rest [Nietzsche] |
| 14850 | Christ was the noblest human being [Nietzsche] |
| 14837 | Christ seems warm hearted, and suppressed intellect in favour of the intellectually weak [Nietzsche] |
| 14828 | Religion is tempting if your life is boring, but you can't therefore impose it on the busy people [Nietzsche] |