Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Purifications (frags)', 'The Limits of Reason' and 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18696 The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
18701 The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
18694 Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18692 Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
18693 Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button]
18695 An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
18700 Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
18698 Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18697 A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]