33 ideas
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
13913 | The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13914 | Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13915 | Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13916 | Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
13850 | In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13849 | Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
13851 | Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
13852 | Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |