Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'comedies (frags)', 'Dialogue on Things and Words' and 'On Interpretation'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


28 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz]
True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
A dog seems handsome to another a dog, and even a pig to another pig [Epicharmus]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Pleasures are like pirates - if you are caught they drown you in a sea of pleasures [Epicharmus]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Hands wash hands; give that you may get [Epicharmus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon [Epicharmus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God knows everything, and nothing is impossible for him [Epicharmus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error
Human logos is an aspect of divine logos, and is sufficient for successful living [Epicharmus]