48 ideas
| 23027 | Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23030 | Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 16066 | Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 23044 | All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 23034 | The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 436 | A dog seems handsome to another a dog, and even a pig to another pig [Epicharmus] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 23032 | What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 442 | Pleasures are like pirates - if you are caught they drown you in a sea of pleasures [Epicharmus] |
| 23033 | Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 440 | Hands wash hands; give that you may get [Epicharmus] |
| 441 | Against a villain, villainy is not a useless weapon [Epicharmus] |
| 23045 | Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH] |
| 23050 | The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH] |
| 23052 | Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH] |
| 23036 | The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23039 | A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23038 | People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
| 23040 | If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 23031 | God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH] |
| 439 | God knows everything, and nothing is impossible for him [Epicharmus] |
| 23041 | God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH] |
| 443 | Human logos is an aspect of divine logos, and is sufficient for successful living [Epicharmus] |