37 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |