17 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| 18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
| 18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
| 18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
| 18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
| 18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
| 18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
| 18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
| 18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
| 18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| 18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |