14 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
18935 | Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer] |
18945 | Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer] |
18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |
18947 | Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer] |
15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |