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All the ideas for 'The Discourses', 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' and 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey'

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110 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus]
Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton]
Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus]
Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton]
If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus]
Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus]
Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus]
Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus]
A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis]
The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis]
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis]
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis]
The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis]
Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis]
We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis]
The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus]