Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Structural Account of Mathematics' and 'Subjective and Objective'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara]
We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara]
In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara]
The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara]