17 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |