Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Principles of Chemistry' and 'Truth'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
4739 In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
4737 Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
4750 The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
4744 We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
4738 The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
4745 Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
4753 Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
4755 Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
4751 Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
4752 Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
4762 The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
4754 Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
4763 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
4746 Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
4764 We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
4759 Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
17402 Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
17399 Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
17400 Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri]
17401 Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev]