Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Mental Events' and 'Russell's Mathematical Logic'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
10041 Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21716 In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
10035 Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10042 Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
10038 A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
10046 The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10039 Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10043 Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
10045 Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4983 There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3529 Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2307 Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
5497 Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
4081 Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
2321 If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
3404 Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3405 If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
16041 Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
6620 Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3429 Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
3524 Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
3526 Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]