153 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
2196 | The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume] |
16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
2187 | If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume] |
2200 | All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume] |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
4636 | All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume] |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
2197 | Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume] |
8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
7700 | We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume] |
8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
13602 | We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume] |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
2216 | We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume] |
2215 | There is no such thing as chance [Hume] |
8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
2209 | Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume] |
2207 | Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume] |
2208 | Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume] |
2213 | Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume] |
3661 | 'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
2191 | Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume] |
8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
2239 | If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume] |
2237 | It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume] |
2192 | All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume] |
2184 | All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume] |
23631 | Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume] |
2182 | Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume] |
2190 | All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume] |
2246 | If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume] |
2189 | All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume] |
2186 | We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume] |
2702 | Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume] |
2217 | When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume] |
2194 | How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume] |
2183 | We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume] |
2205 | You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume] |
23421 | If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume] |
3902 | Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume] |
2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
2235 | There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume] |
10328 | We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume] |
2230 | Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG] |
2238 | Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume] |
2242 | Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume] |
2243 | Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume] |
2236 | Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume] |
2240 | It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume] |
2241 | The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume] |
2198 | We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume] |
2201 | Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume] |
2203 | If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume] |
2204 | All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume] |
2199 | Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume] |
2202 | Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume] |
6350 | Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume] |
3598 | Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume] |
2210 | A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume] |
17712 | General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume] |
8544 | Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
2211 | When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume] |
2212 | An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume] |
2214 | Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume] |
2222 | The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume] |
2223 | Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume] |
3655 | Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume] |
8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
2220 | Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume] |
2224 | Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume] |
2225 | If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume] |
2226 | Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume] |
2233 | No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume] |
2195 | We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume] |
2245 | A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume] |
4772 | If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume] |
8341 | Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
8344 | At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson] |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
3662 | Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
4771 | In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume] |
5194 | Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume] |
2221 | A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume] |
2234 | It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume] |
2193 | No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume] |
8422 | Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume] |
2218 | In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume] |
15249 | Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume] |
8339 | Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
2244 | It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume] |
2232 | You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume] |
2228 | All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume] |
2229 | To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume] |
2227 | A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume] |
2185 | The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume] |