Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Philosophy of Arithmetic' and 'Davidson on himself'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
9837 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
9576 Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
17444 Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9575 Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
21214 We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9819 Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl]
9851 Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]