Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' and 'Apology for Raymond Sebond'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
6259 Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
6263 No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
6258 Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
6262 We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6260 Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
6261 The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]