Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'Euthydemus'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]