22 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |