Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Theodicy' and 'A Defense of Presentism'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz]
Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz]