Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Reasons of Love' and 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
9240 Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9228 Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
9238 Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9232 It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
9234 If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
9229 What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
9233 Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
9235 Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
9236 Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
9237 The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
9239 I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
9227 We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
9230 People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
9241 Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9300 Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
9231 Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]