Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Words without Objects' and 'World and Essence'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12797 If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12794 Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17694 Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
17695 Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
12818 We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12795 Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17696 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12791 It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]