Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Subject with No Object' and 'A Priori'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
17713 After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
9921 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
9924 Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
9933 The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
9928 Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
9926 A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9932 The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
9923 We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17715 The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
9925 Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
9934 Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17716 Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9918 Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
9929 Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9927 Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
9930 Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
17703 Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
17714 Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
17705 Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17700 The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17704 Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17710 Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
17706 The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9919 The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
17701 Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
17702 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
9922 If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
17708 Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]