100 ideas
| 23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
| 23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
| 21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
| 20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
| 11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
| 23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
| 23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
| 10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
| 10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
| 10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
| 10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
| 10671 | Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack] |
| 11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
| 10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
| 10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
| 10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
| 10673 | Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack] |
| 10680 | The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack] |
| 10684 | I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack] |
| 10674 | A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack] |
| 10681 | In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack] |
| 10685 | Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack] |
| 14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
| 10668 | We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack] |
| 11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
| 11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
| 11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
| 11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
| 10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
| 14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
| 11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
| 14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
| 11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
| 10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
| 10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
| 14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
| 10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
| 10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
| 11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
| 11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
| 11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
| 11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
| 11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
| 11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
| 11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
| 11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
| 11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
| 11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
| 11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
| 23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
| 23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
| 11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
| 23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
| 23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
| 23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
| 23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
| 23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
| 23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
| 20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
| 23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
| 10663 | A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack] |
| 11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
| 11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
| 23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
| 20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
| 23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
| 23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
| 23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
| 23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
| 23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
| 23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
| 23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
| 23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
| 23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
| 23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
| 23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
| 23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
| 23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
| 23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
| 23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
| 20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
| 23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
| 22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
| 23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
| 11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
| 10683 | We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack] |
| 23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
| 23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
| 23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |