15 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |