16 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |