18 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| 9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
| 13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
| 9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
| 9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
| 9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
| 13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
| 13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
| 13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
| 13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
| 13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
| 13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
| 13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
| 9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
| 9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
| 9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
| 9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
| 9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |