84 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |