18 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
| 9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
| 9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
| 9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
| 9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
| 9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
| 9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |