Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy' and 'Anti-essentialism'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]