Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Causation and Supervenience' and 'Non-foundationalist epistemology'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin]
Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley]
The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]