Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Epistemic Injustice' and 'The Empirical Stance'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M]
We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M]
Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M]
Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M]