119 ideas
11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |