Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Passions of the Soul' and 'A Defense of Presentism'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]