15 ideas
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |