20 ideas
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| 18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
| 18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
| 18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
| 18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
| 18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
| 18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
| 18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
| 18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
| 18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
| 18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |