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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic' and 'Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature?'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10001 An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10007 Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
9998 What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber]
10002 '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10003 Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
10008 Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
10005 Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
10000 We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
10006 First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
12790 Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12789 Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
14386 Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan]
12787 Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan]
14384 We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan]
14388 Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
14389 There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
10004 Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
14387 Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
14382 Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
14385 Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
14383 A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan]