Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Evidence' and 'Explanation and Reference'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
17505 Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11908 Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17508 Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
17507 Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
11904 Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]