Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Community' and 'Value Theory'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
23418 Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
23414 Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
23410 Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
23409 Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
23419 Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka]
23413 Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka]
23415 Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
23411 Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka]
23412 Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka]