Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Vagaries of Definition' and 'Truth-making and Correspondence'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]