Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' and 'works'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall]
Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]