Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Mind and Body'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
7755 Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
4986 A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
5001 Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
4993 If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
5000 Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
4982 Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
4991 Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
4994 Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4992 In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4990 The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
4984 All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
4998 Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4985 If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
4997 It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
7768 The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
7766 Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
4999 For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
7764 Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan]
7763 It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4995 Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7770 Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
7773 A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
7774 Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]