Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letter to Menoeceus', 'World and Essence' and 'Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
14052 Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19392 I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
14062 Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
1837 We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
1836 Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
14061 Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
14054 Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus]
14053 It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus]
14055 The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
14057 All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
14058 Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
1833 Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
14063 Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
14059 The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
1835 True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
14056 We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
14060 Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus]