113 ideas
22733 | Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
13291 | Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus] |
22758 | Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus] |
14523 | We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus] |
22240 | The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus] |
1484 | We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
2670 | Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
8721 | An 'impredicative' definition seems circular, because it uses the term being defined [Friend] |
8680 | Classical definitions attempt to refer, but intuitionist/constructivist definitions actually create objects [Friend] |
3678 | Reductio ad absurdum proves an idea by showing that its denial produces contradiction [Friend] |
8705 | Anti-realists see truth as our servant, and epistemically contrained [Friend] |
8713 | In classical/realist logic the connectives are defined by truth-tables [Friend] |
8708 | Double negation elimination is not valid in intuitionist logic [Friend] |
8694 | Free logic was developed for fictional or non-existent objects [Friend] |
8665 | A 'proper subset' of A contains only members of A, but not all of them [Friend] |
8672 | A 'powerset' is all the subsets of a set [Friend] |
8677 | Set theory makes a minimum ontological claim, that the empty set exists [Friend] |
8666 | Infinite sets correspond one-to-one with a subset [Friend] |
8682 | Major set theories differ in their axioms, and also over the additional axioms of choice and infinity [Friend] |
21668 | Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
8709 | The law of excluded middle is syntactic; it just says A or not-A, not whether they are true or false [Friend] |
21676 | Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
8711 | Intuitionists read the universal quantifier as "we have a procedure for checking every..." [Friend] |
8675 | Paradoxes can be solved by talking more loosely of 'classes' instead of 'sets' [Friend] |
8674 | The Burali-Forti paradox asks whether the set of all ordinals is itself an ordinal [Friend] |
8667 | The 'integers' are the positive and negative natural numbers, plus zero [Friend] |
8668 | The 'rational' numbers are those representable as fractions [Friend] |
8670 | A number is 'irrational' if it cannot be represented as a fraction [Friend] |
8661 | The natural numbers are primitive, and the ordinals are up one level of abstraction [Friend] |
8664 | Cardinal numbers answer 'how many?', with the order being irrelevant [Friend] |
8671 | The 'real' numbers (rationals and irrationals combined) is the Continuum, which has no gaps [Friend] |
8663 | Raising omega to successive powers of omega reveal an infinity of infinities [Friend] |
8662 | The first limit ordinal is omega (greater, but without predecessor), and the second is twice-omega [Friend] |
8669 | Between any two rational numbers there is an infinite number of rational numbers [Friend] |
8676 | Is mathematics based on sets, types, categories, models or topology? [Friend] |
8678 | Most mathematical theories can be translated into the language of set theory [Friend] |
8701 | The number 8 in isolation from the other numbers is of no interest [Friend] |
8702 | In structuralism the number 8 is not quite the same in different structures, only equivalent [Friend] |
8699 | Are structures 'ante rem' (before reality), or are they 'in re' (grounded in physics)? [Friend] |
8696 | Structuralist says maths concerns concepts about base objects, not base objects themselves [Friend] |
8695 | Structuralism focuses on relations, predicates and functions, with objects being inessential [Friend] |
8700 | 'In re' structuralism says that the process of abstraction is pattern-spotting [Friend] |
8681 | The big problem for platonists is epistemic: how do we perceive, intuit, know or detect mathematical facts? [Friend] |
8712 | Mathematics should be treated as true whenever it is indispensable to our best physical theory [Friend] |
8716 | Formalism is unconstrained, so cannot indicate importance, or directions for research [Friend] |
8706 | Constructivism rejects too much mathematics [Friend] |
8707 | Intuitionists typically retain bivalence but reject the law of excluded middle [Friend] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
8704 | Structuralists call a mathematical 'object' simply a 'place in a structure' [Friend] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
1823 | We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1824 | To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
5949 | Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
1821 | Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
1820 | The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1822 | Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
4549 | Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus] |
2668 | Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
1483 | Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
1487 | When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus] |
1482 | If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
14526 | The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus] |
6035 | Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
6018 | Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley] |
20922 | Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
14516 | There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
8685 | Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend] |
1909 | How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus] |
8688 | Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend] |
7814 | It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling] |
3562 | Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus] |
1840 | Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1839 | Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1842 | Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus] |
3557 | The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas] |
1845 | Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus] |
1841 | We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1829 | A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
1843 | Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus] |
1831 | Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius] |
12044 | Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas] |
20907 | Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
21669 | Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus] |
21680 | What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
14525 | Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus] |
2637 | For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
2633 | Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
2639 | Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero] |
14527 | If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus] |