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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Relativism' and 'Reference and Generality (3rd ed)'

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75 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Epicurus accepted God in his popular works, but not in his writings on nature [Epicurus, by Sext.Empiricus]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / d. Contemporary philosophy
There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Slavery to philosophy brings true freedom [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at a happy life, through argument and discussion [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
We should come to philosophy free from any taint of culture [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / f. Philosophy as healing
The aim of medicine is removal of sickness, and philosophy similarly removes our affections [Epicurus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
We should say nothing of the whole if our contact is with the parts [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Epicurus despises and laughs at the whole of dialectic [Epicurus, by Cicero]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady]
The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Epicurus rejected excluded middle, because accepting it for events is fatalistic [Epicurus, by Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
We can't seek for things if we have no idea of them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Epicurus says colours are relative to the eye, not intrinsic to bodies [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sensations cannot be judged, because similar sensations have equal value, and different ones have nothing in common [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Reason can't judge senses, as it is based on them [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Epicurus denied knowledge in order to retain morality or hedonism as the highest values [Nietzsche on Epicurus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Epicurus says if one of a man's senses ever lies, none of his senses should ever be believed [Epicurus, by Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady]
If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The rational soul is in the chest, and the non-rational soul is spread through the body [Epicurus]
Soul is made of four stuffs, giving warmth, rest, motion and perception [Epicurus, by Aetius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Epicurus showed that the swerve can give free motion in the atoms [Epicurus, by Diogenes of Oen.]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
How can pleasure or judgement occur in a heap of atoms? [Sext.Empiricus on Epicurus]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus]
The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Justice has no independent existence, but arises entirely from keeping contracts [Epicurus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We choose virtue because of pleasure, not for its own sake [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
A wise man would be happy even under torture [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship is by far the most important ingredient of a complete and happy life [Epicurus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Wise men should partake of life even if they go blind [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Only Epicurus denied purpose in nature, for the whole world, or for its parts [Epicurus, by Annas]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Democritus says atoms have size and shape, and Epicurus added weight [Epicurus, by Ps-Plutarch]
Atoms don't swerve by being struck, because they move in parallel, so the swerve is uncaused [Cicero on Epicurus]
What causes atomic swerves? Do they draw lots? What decides the size or number of swerves? [Cicero on Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Stoics say time is incorporeal and self-sufficient; Epicurus says it is a property of properties of things [Epicurus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
For Epicureans gods are made of atoms, and are not eternal [Epicurus, by Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Epicurus saw that gods must exist, because nature has imprinted them on human minds [Epicurus, by Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Some say Epicurus only pretended to believe in the gods, so as not to offend Athenians [Epicurus, by Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
If god answered prayers we would be destroyed, because we pray for others to suffer [Epicurus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady]