60 ideas
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
19855 | The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee] |
19856 | The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee] |
19861 | There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee] |
19858 | No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee] |
19859 | Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee] |
19857 | All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee] |
19862 | Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee] |
19860 | Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee] |
14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |