Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Periodic Table', 'Dialogue on Things and Words' and 'Action'

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64 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts [Leibniz]
True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false [Leibniz]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R]
Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R]
If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R]
For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R]
There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri]
If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri]
If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri]
Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri]
How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri]
Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri]
Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri]
A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri]
19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri]
Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri]
Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri]
Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri]
Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri]
Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri]
Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri]
The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri]
Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri]
Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri]
To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri]